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We provide empirical evidence from a number of European countries, which shows that 
unemployment and output are positively related when unemployment is low and inversely 
related when unemployment is high.  We then construct a stylised macro-model with goods 
and labour market imperfections to show that the economy can rationally operate at an 
inefficient equilibrium in the neighbourhood of which the relationship between output and 
unemployment is positive.  Our results suggest that circumstances exist in which market 
imperfections pose serious obstacles to the smooth working of expansionary and/or 
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1.   Introduction 
In the last few decades, the industrialised nations of Europe have been subjected to a 
variety of external and policy-induced demand shocks while simultaneously experiencing 
significant changes in their labour productivity and employment.  Meanwhile, some leading 
economists have argued that persistent involuntary unemployment may give rise to 
externalities that could be exploited by economic agents.  A much-discussed example in this 
context is for price-setting firms to use high or rising unemployment as a device to deter 
shirking.  Lindbeck (1992) suggests that in this setting, macroeconomic policy interventions 
may produce unexpected consequences: "In the context of a nonmarket-clearing labour 
market, it is certainly reasonable to regard unemployment, in particular highly persistent 
unemployment, as a major macroeconomic distortion. There is therefore a potential case for 
policy actions, provided such actions do not create more problems than they solve.   
Experience in many countries suggests that the latter reservation is not trivial."     
 
To more fully explore the extent to which these concerns are warranted, we first 
examine the aggregate data on unemployment and output for a number of European 
countries.  Our empirical evidence shows that it is not uncommon for output and 
unemployment to be related according to a humped-shape relationship.   More specifically, 
we find that changes in output and unemployment are correlated negatively (positively) when 
the latter is relatively high (low).  It is when these variables co-vary positively that an 
expansionary shock may yield counterintuitive effects.  We next develop a theoretical model 
that shows such a relationship can result when labour and goods market operate under certain 
plausible conditions.  An important policy insight that emerges from this paper is that an 
exogenous stimulation of aggregate demand can only raise output and reduce unemployment 
provided the economy is operating relatively efficiently.  The intuition for this lies in the 
supply side nonlinearities that could give rise to multiple equilibria.  We show that when an  2 
economy is trapped in an inefficient equilibrium, positive demand shocks can lead, 
perversely, to an increase in unemployment. 
 
Other recent examples of related theoretical research, which examines the link 
between European unemployment and productivity, include Malley and Moutos (2001), Leith 
and Li (2001), Daveri and Tabellini (2000), Blanchard (1998), Caballero and Hammour 
(1998a,b), Gordon (1997) and Manning (1992).  However, none of these studies explores the 
link between unemployment and output arising from both labour and product market 
imperfections.   
 
On the empirical side, a large number of studies have examined the behaviour of 
labour productivity in the industrialised countries and provide indisputable evidence 
regarding the way in which labour productivity has changed over the last few decades. 
Recent examples include Disney, et al. (2000), Barnes and Haskel (2000), Marini and 
Scaramozzino (2000), Bart van Ark et al. (2000) and Sala-i-Martin (1996).  The evidence 
provided in these studies is usually interpreted using one of the micro-theory based 
explanations underlying the behaviour of labour productivity.  These may, in general, be 
divided into two categories.  The first concentrates on the productivity gains that can be 
realised through: i) improved skill due to training; ii) increased efficiency due to progress in 
management and restructuring; and iii) rising physical productivity of other factors of 
production due to R&D, etc..  The second category emphasises market forces and sees 
competition and market selection as the main motivation behind the rise in efficiency.  The 
separating line between these two accounts is not very clear in the sense that the second will 
have to be achieved through the first when the economy is operating efficiently.  However, if 
the economy happens to be in an inefficient phase, market forces can act directly without  3 
having to induce any of the factors in the first category.  The efficiency wage hypothesis is a 
typical example of this case and will be used in this paper to illustrate the point.  
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 examines data from a number of 
European countries on output and unemployment and reports the evidence on how 
movements in output are matched with changes in unemployment.  Section 3 outlines a 
theoretical model based on the efficiency wage hypothesis and shows that the production side 
of the economy – consisting of monopolistically competitive firms that set prices and offer 
efficiency wages to maximise profits – can give rise to a non-linear equilibrium relationship 
between output and unemployment, consistent with the evidence reported in Section 2. 
Section 3 concludes the paper and finally the Appendix outlines the derivation of the effort 
function we utilise in our theoretical model.  
 
2.   Output and Unemployment:  Some Stylised Facts  
Our aim in this section is to explore the way changes in unemployment and output are 
related to each other empirically.  However, it would be helpful if, a priori, we postulate an 
equilibrium that sustains involuntary unemployment and allow for the latter to affect 
workers’ effort supply.  In this case, because there is a causal relationship between the level 
of unemployment and the productivity of the employed, a total change in output can be 
decomposed into changes due to employment and productivity.  As a result, a sufficient 
condition for an expansionary demand shock to raise both output and employment is that the 
resulting fall in unemployment does not induce a fall in productivity of the employed to such 
an extent that it eliminates the effect of the rise in employment.  Defining aggregate labour 
productivity as q=Y/L where Y,  L and q respectively denote output, employment and 
productivity, and noting that dq=(dY-qdL)/L, it is clear that any of the six cases outlined in  4 
Table 1 could, in principle, occur in the aggregate (see Barnes and Haskel, 2000, for evidence 
at plant level).  
 
Table 1.  Simultaneous Changes in Labour Productivity, 











dL<0 dY>0  du>0 
dL>0  dY>0  du<0 
Rising 
Productivity 
dq>0  dL<0  dY<0  du>0 
dL>0 dY<0  du<0 
dL<0  dY<0  du>0 
Falling 
Productivity 
dq<0  dL>0  dY>0  du<0 
 
 
The last column of Table 1 shows the implied changes in the unemployment rate 
(based on the approximation that the labour force is constant).  This discussion clearly 
suggests that it is a distinct possibility that output and unemployment can fall or rise 
simultaneously.  While the cases in which changes in output and unemployment have 
opposite signs can be easily explained by a variety of standard theories, a convincing 
macroeconomic theory capable of predicting why these variables fall or rise simultaneously is 
more elusive.  To obtain a more realistic indication of whether output and unemployment 
simultaneously move in the same direction, in Table 2 we examine quarterly data for a cross 
section of 10 European countries, chosen to reflect a wide range of industrial structures as 
well as macroeconomic and labour market experiences over the last few decades.  
 
Table 2 shows, for each country, the directions of quarterly changes as a proportion of 
the entire sample for which changes in output and unemployment have the same sign, that is 
] 0 du & 0 dY [ t s t > > ±  and  ] 0 du & 0 dY [ t s t < < ±  for s=0,2,4.  The results corresponding to 
contemporaneous changes (middle column) indicate that for a substantial and statistically 
significant proportion of the sample (i.e. at least 35% of the sample for all countries) the sign 
combinations show  output  and unemployment moving in the same direction.  It  is also clear   5 
 
Table 2.  Directions of Quarterly Changes in Output, Y, & Unemployment Rate, u;  








































































































































































































































































0.473 0.342 0.357  0.467 0.460 
The number of observations, n, and the sample period correspond to the contemporaneous 
changes in the natural logarithm of real GDP (market prices), Y, and the unemployment rate, 
u. Based on a one-sample 2-tailed t-test the mean number occurrences of (dYt± s>0 & dut>0) 
and (dYt± s<0 & dut<0) are significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level of significance. 
This result also holds across all leads,  lags and countries. Countries are defined as follows: 
Belgium (BEL), West Germany (DEU), Spain (ESP), France (FRA), UK (GBR), Ireland 
(IRE), Italy (ITA), Netherlands (NLD), Portugal (PRT), Sweden (SWE); Y and u are obtained 
from the OECD Business Sector Database. 
 
from Table 2 that these findings hold for lagged and led changes, which we have considered 
in order to capture the variations over business cycle.  Moreover, when the non-
contemporaneous changes are considered, the proportion of periods where Y and u are 
positively related increases for virtually all other cases considered
1.  Given the results in 
Table 2, it seems fair to conclude that theories disregarding   this   possibility – by  employing 
models with market structures which are only capable of generating the prediction that Y and  6 
u are negatively related  – can only be of limited use when analysing the potential effects of 
macroeconomic policies. 
 
  The evidence in Table 2 pertaining to changes in output and unemployment having 
the same sign is potentially consistent with a number of alternative explanations, e.g.  i) an 
exogenous increase the labour force participation; ii) the net result of simultaneous 
exogenous shocks to both aggregate supply and demand which would move output and 
unemployment simultaneously in the same direction; or iii) the theories of creative 
destruction (see, for examples, Aghion and Howitt, 1992; 1994).  However, if the periods in 
which output and unemployment are positively related occur on a systematic basis, the above 
explanations will prove inadequate since they all rely on random impulse mechanisms.  We 
therefore next focus our analysis on this aspect of the evidence, i.e. a regular occurrence of 
positive and negative correlations between changes in output and unemployment.  To do so, 
we first test to see if the occurrences of  ] 0 du & 0 dY [ t t > >   and  ] 0 du & 0 dY [ t t < <  
reported in Table 2 are random.  To this end we employ a simple ‘runs test’ which is a one-
sample nonparametric test for randomness in a dichotomous variable.  Given that a run is 
defined as any sequence of cases having the same value, we assign 1 to those periods where 
[dYt>0 & dut>0] and [dYt<0 & dut<0] and 0 to all other periods.  The total number of runs in 
the sample is a measure of randomness in the order of the cases; too many or too few runs 
can suggest a non-random, or dependent, ordering.  The results are reported in Table 3 below 
where the rows in bold indicate the countries (i.e. Italy and Sweden) for which we are unable 
to reject the null hypothesis of randomness in the runs.  Accordingly, these countries are 
excluded from further analysis below where we will focus on exploring the existence and 
                                                                                                                                                        
1   In the empirical analysis, which follows, we shall concentrate on the contemporaneous changes only since 
this case clearly does not over-record the proportion of periods when Y and u are moving in the same 
direction.  7 
nature of the systematic relationship between changes in unemployment and output, as 
supported by the majority of cases.  
 
Table 3.  Runs Tests for the Significant Systematic Occurrences of  
[dYt>0 & dut>0] and [dYt<0 & dut<0] Cases. 




T.S.V. A  .S. 
BEL 0.417  88  63  151  25 -8.301  0.000 
DEU 0.345  78  41  119  43 -2.397  0.017 
ESP 0.480  79  73  152  47 -4.871  0.000 
FRA 0.553  59  73  132  50 -2.874  0.004 
GBR 0.370  97  57  154  58 -2.568  0.010 
IRE 0.430  86  65  151  29 -7.668  0.000 
ITA 0.513  75  79  154  76 -0.315  0.753 
NLD 0.400  69  46  115  35 -4.138  0.000 
PRT 0.629  56  95  151  42 -5.158  0.000 
SWE 0.357  99  55  154  62  -1.711  0.087 
T.V. is the Test Value (mean cut point); T.S.V. is the value of the test statistic; A.S. is the 2-tailed 
asymptotic significance level. 
 
 
  At this stage it is helpful to compare summary measures of central tendency of the 
unemployment rate across the two different states, i.e. state 1:  ] 0 du & 0 dY [ t t > >  and 
] 0 du & 0 dY [ t t < <  and state 0:  ] 0 du & 0 dY [ t t < >  and [ 0 & 0] tt dY du <> .  These 
simple comparisons are reported in Table 4 below and show clearly that states 0 and 1 are 
likely to occur at high and low levels of unemployment, respectively.  With the exception of 
German data, the evidence shows a clear tendency for unemployment to be lower when 
output and unemployment are positively related and higher when they are negatively related.  
 
  The clear pattern that emerges from the analysis, summarised as  
 
State 0:  ] 0 du & 0 dY [ t t < >  and [ 0 & 0] tt dY du <>  are more likely to occur 
when ut  is relatively high 
 
State 1:  ] 0 du & 0 dY [ t t > >  and  ] 0 du & 0 dY [ t t < <  are more likely to occur 
when ut  is relatively low; and 
  8 
 
Table 4.  Comparing Mean and Median Unemployment Rates for the 



























BEL 6.655  7.345  -0.689  7.066  8.847  -1.781 
DEU 3.503  3.267  0.236  3.246  2.909  0.337 
ESP 10.436  11.684  -1.248  7.603  15.351  -7.748 
FRA 6.285  7.609  -1.323  5.661  9.002  -3.341 
GBR 5.615  5.803  -0.187  4.419  5.914  -1.495 
IRE 9.350  9.611  -0.261  7.765  8.310  -0.545 
NLD 4.911  5.965  -1.054  4.071  5.856  -1.785 
PRT 5.962  6.789  -0.828  5.593  7.106  -1.513 
 
 
can be used to postulate a behavioural, or theoretical, structure that could embrace the above 
findings.  For instance, as we shall see later, this type of systematic pattern in data is 
consistent with the theoretical implications of the efficiency wage hypothesis, which predicts 
a causal relationship between output and unemployment through the effect of the latter on 
productivity of workers.  Of the 10 European countries examined above only Italy, Sweden 
and Germany do not match this prediction, even though as seen from Table 2 they too have a 
significant number of occurrences of output and unemployment moving in the same 
direction.  This discrepancy may be due to the differences in the way labour markets function 
in these countries, e.g. use of guest labour, style of unionisation etc.. However, further 
investigation of these results is beyond the scope of this paper, as we do not attempt to 
empirically establish the general validity of any particular theory.  Our primary purpose is to 
understand the regularities in data and to develop a theory capable of explaining them.  
 
  As a final attempt to further describe the stylised relationship between output and 
unemployment, suggested by the above data analysis, we estimate by GMM a quadratic 
relationship between de-trended output and unemployment.  The results of this estimation for 
the remaining seven countries in Table 4 are given in Table 5 below.  They show clear  9 
support for a humped-shaped relationship between output and unemployment.  As a tentative 
measure, we have also calculated the level of unemployment, denoted by u , at which output 
reaches its maximum value.  Note that, according to the behaviour postulated above, u  is the 
threshold level of unemployment, which separates State 1 from State 0.   
 
Table 5.  GMM Estimates of  () ()
2
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is de-trended ln(Y).  Four lags of Y
~
and u were used as instruments in 
vector z. Estimation method was based on Quadratic Barlett Kernel using 
8 autocorrelation terms. Numbers in parentheses are the estimated HAC 
standard errors. Numbers in square brackets are the corresponding p-





3.   Output and Unemployment:  Theory 
In this section we examine whether the relationship deduced from data in the previous 
section can be derived from a stylised theoretical macro-model – e.g. of the type outlined by 
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).  We therefore construct a suitable version of the latter, which 
allows for unemployment to be sustained in equilibrium.  To incorporate this modification we 
endow the model with market imperfections in both the labour and the goods market by  10 
allowing for firms to be monopolistically competitive and to reward workers’ effort by 
paying efficiency wages.  
 
Following the work of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Yellen (1984), a number of 
models have employed some version of the efficiency wage hypothesis to study various 
aspects of macroeconomic activity.  Examples can found in: Agénor and Aizenman (1999) 
and Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) on fiscal and labour market policies; Andersen and 
Rasmussen (1999), Pisauro (1991) and Carter (1999) on the role of the tax system; Leamer 
(1999) on specialisation; Albrecht and Vroman (1996), Fehr (1991) and Smidt-Sørensen 
(1990) on properties of labour demand; and Smidt-Sørensen (1991) on working hours.  In this 
paper we employ a standard version of the hypothesis which postulates an effort supply 
function that is derived by workers maximising the expected utility from work as explained in 
the Appendix.   
 
The model is static and describes an economy with three types of agents: firms, 
households and a government. Firms are monopolistically competitive and each produce a 
variety of a horizontally differentiated product using labour as input with an increasing 
returns to scale technology.  Households are endowed with a unit of labour, which they 
supply inelastically.  Unemployed households receive a benefit transfer from the government. 
The government revenue, raised by taxing the households, is used to subsidise the 
unemployed and to pay for government consumption.  The final good in the economy is the 
Dixit-Stiglitz CES bundle of horizontally differentiated varieties produced by identical firms 
described later.  
 
The demand side of the model consists of the households’ and government’s 
consumption.  The latter is given by   11 
PG dj g P
N j
j j = ∫
∈
,                               (1) 
where j is the index denoting a variety of the differentiated good, N  is the mass of varieties 























,                               (2) 
where  G  is the corresponding CES bundle with the constant elasticity of substitution
2 
between any two varieties s>1,  
)] s / 1 ( 1 /[ 1
N j
) s / 1 ( 1
j












= ∫ , 
 
and P is the price index dual to G; (2) maximises G above subject to (1).  The government 
expenditure comprises (1) and the unemployment benefit payments B per unemployed 
worker/household.  This expenditure is financed by a lump sum tax
3, T, which, together with 
the normalisation of the number of households to unity – on the assumption that each 
household is endowed with one unit of labour – gives rise to the following budget constraint  
PG + uB = T.                                (3) 
 
Each household is endowed with initial money holdings  M  and receives distributed 
profits Π . In addition, it also supplies, inelastically, its unit of labour and at any point in time 
it can either be employed or be unemployed.  When employed, a typical household works for 
a firm j, supplying the effort level ej>0 and earning nominal wage Wj. If unemployed, it 
receives from the government the nominal unemployment benefit B at no effort.  Dropping 
the distinction between firms and setting profit income to zero (anticipating the symmetric 
                                                 
2   See Molana and Zhang (2001) for a study of the role of a variable elasticity of substitution in the context of 
fiscal policy effectiveness.  Note also that, following the common practice the CES bundle is normalised by 
the mass of varieties, N, to switch off the variety effect in the aggregate.  12 
equilibrium and elimination of profits through a free entry and exit process), a household’s 
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where 
)] s / 1 ( 1 /[ 1
N j
) s / 1 ( 1
j












= ∫ ,  
and P is the corresponding price index dual to C; (5) maximises C above subject to the 
constraint   PC dj c P
N j




Household’s utility is given by
4  
() ( ) e f P / M , C v V ⋅ − = λ ,                                       (6) 
where, in addition to the usual component v,  which we assume to be a Cobb-Douglas 












P / M C
P / M , C v ,   
                                                                                                                                                        
3   The use of a lump-sum tax is a common simplification in the literature which reduces the distortionary role 
of the government.  For further explanations see Molana and Moutos (1991), Heijdra and Van der Ploeg 
(1996) and Heijdra, et al. (1998) among others.  
4   For simplicity, like most studies we assume complete separation between households’ and government’s 
consumption. Therefore, government consumption does not appear in households’ utility function.  For some 
exceptions see, for example, Molana and Moutos (1989), Heijdra et al (1998) and Reinhorn (1998) who 
extend the original results by allowing for some substitution between the public and private consumption.  13 
the utility function also depends on the level of effort, e, that an employed household will 
supply when working.  () 0 e f ≥  captures the disutility of effort; λ =1 for an employed 
household; and λ =0 when the household is unemployed.  Assuming that  () e f  is taken as 
given (see Appendix A.1 for further details on the relevance of these and the derivation of the 
effort function) and maximising the utility function of an employed and an unemployed 
household subject to their respective budget constraint yields their consumption and money 
demand equations. Normalising the number of households to unity and using L and u to 
denote the proportions of employed and unemployed households, we have  
L+ u=1.                 ( 7 )  
Using this normalisation, the household sector’s aggregate consumption and money demand 
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α .                         (9) 
 
Given the above, the aggregate demand for the CES bundle, facing the 
monopolistically competitive firms, is Y = C+ G.  On the assumption that each firm produces 
a distinct variety – given the incentive to specialise due to falling average costs explained 
























j ,                                 (10) 
                                                 
5   We have followed the existing studies in assuming that G and C are similar CES bundles. See Startz (1989), 
Dixon and Lawler (1996), Heijdra and Van der Ploeg (1996) and Heijdra, et al. (1998) for further details.   14 
since.  It is a straightforward exercise to show that P, Y and N satisfy the following 
)] s / 1 ( 1 /[ 1
N j
) s / 1 ( 1
j












= ∫ ,                          (11) 
PY dj y P
N j
j j = ∫
∈
,                             (12) 
and  


















= ∫ .                           (13) 
 
Labour is assumed to be the only factor of production, and to be perfectly mobile 
between firms.  Firm j’s technology is given by the following production function  
φ − = j j j L e y ,                              (14) 
where  j L  is the variable labour input, ej is labour productivity and φ  is a constant parameter 
reflecting the fixed cost of production assumed to be identical across firms.  The increasing 
returns to scale implied by falling average cost therefore gives rise to the incentive for full 
specialisation from which a one-to-one correspondence between the mass of varieties and 
firms in the market results.  
 
We assume that ej is determined by workers’ attitude towards shirking and represents 
their optimal effort supply function which depends on: i) the real value of the wage paid by 
the firm  P / W w j j = ;  ii)  the real value of the unemployment benefit, b=B/P, which the 
government transfers to the unemployed household; and iii) the extent of unemployment in  15 
the economy captured by the unemployment rate
6 u.  Thus, we postulate the following effort 
supply function for a worker employed by firm j 
) u , b , w ( e e j j = ,                                       (15) 
which is assumed to satisfy the following properties,  
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An effort function, which satisfies the above properties, is explicitly derived in Appendix A1.  
 
Each individual firm takes P, Y, N, u and B as given and chooses its ‘efficiency wage’ 
j W  and its price  j P  so as to maximise its profit 
j j j j j L W y P − = π ,                             (16) 
subject to the demand function in (10) and the production function in (14) as well as taking 
account of its workers’ reaction to the choice of Wj which is given by the effort function in 
(15).  The first order conditions are  0 W / j j = ∂ π ∂  and  0 P / j j = ∂ π ∂  whose solution imply 








= ,                               (17) 
and 
                                                 
6   Given that the number of households is normalised to 1, u  is simply the proportion of unemployed 
households and is equivalent to the unemployment rate. 














= .                             (18) 
  
  Equation (17) is a well-known result in the efficiency wage literature and implies that 
firms raise their wage rate up to the point where the effort function is unit elastic.  Equation 
(18) is the usual mark-up pricing rule for a monopolistically competitive firm.  In a 
symmetric equilibrium where all firms are identical, we drop the subscript j and write the 
above equations as  
e w ) u , b , w ( ew = ⋅ ′ ,                            (17´)  
and  
w ) u , b , w ( e σ = ,                                       (18´) 
where  σ = s/(s-1). To see the (partial equilibrium) implications of these, first note that 
together they yield 
σ = ′ ) u , b , w ( ew >1.                                 (19) 
  










>0,                                  (20) 
which shows that an increase in the benefit rate raises the unemployment rate. Totally 



























,                                                         (21) 
Thus, under our assumptions regarding the shape of the effort function, (21) implies de/du >0 
which is consistent with the theoretical consensus that the net result of an increase in 
unemployment rate is to raise workers’ effort level.    17 
We can use the above results to examine the way in which equilibrium output and 
unemployment are related to each other on the supply side.  The symmetric equilibrium of the 
industry is obtained when entry eliminates profits,  
WL PY dj
N j
j − = = ∫
∈





jdj L L  is total employment.  Thus, through free entry and exit process N adjusts to 
ensure  Π =0.  Imposing this on (22) and solving for Y  gives  Y = wL, from which upon 





= .                                         (23) 
 
Equation (23) may be interpreted as a ￿quasi-aggregate￿ production function. It traces 
the combinations of aggregate employment and output (L,Y) which satisfy the supply side 
equilibrium in which labour productivity is determined by an effort supply function and firms 
pay wages to induces workers to supply the effort level that maximises their profits.  Or, put 
differently, these combinations give the equilibrium locus that describes how Y changes as 
firms and workers respond to changes in u while the wage is adjusted to ensure the resulting 
effort supply maximises profits.  Totally differentiating (23) and noting that dL= ￿ du from 


































.                                    (24) 
  
Thus, provided that de/du in (21) is finite as  1 u → , we would expect the right-hand-side of 
(24) to be negative for sufficiently large levels of u.  Conversely, starting from very low 
levels of u, we would expect the right-hand-side of (24) to be positive as long as de/du in (21)  18 
is positive, as explained above.  Given these and assuming that de/du in (21) is continuous in 
u, the equilibrium locus in (u, Y) space may be depicted as in Figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1. The relationship between output 
and unemployment with efficiency wages and 
monopolistic competition 
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  The shape depicted in Figure 1 is consistent with our empirical evidence reported in 
the previous section which showed that, in seven out of ten countries, dY/du is likely to 
change from positive to negative as the level of unemployment passes a certain threshold.  
Within the context of the model developed above, the maximum level of output  Y Y =  is 
achieved at this point where  u u = .  Prior to this point, effort – and hence productivity – is 
relatively lower but is rising with u.  Also, the positive effect of a rise in productivity 
dominates the negative effect of loss of labour as firms shed workers.  Beyond u the opposite 
holds and shedding labour that is working efficiently results in a reduction in the level of 
output. 
 
It is clear that in the economy described above firms will (rationally) produce the 
same level of output, Y1 say, employing either (1-ul) inefficient workers or (1-uh) efficient 
workers. Thus, multiple equilibria can arise given the nonlinear nature of the relationship  19 
between output and employment
8.  As a result, the effect of a policy shock on employment 
and output depends on the initial equilibrium and unemployment can fall in the event of a 
positive shock only if the economy is operating in the efficient region where  u u ≥ . Finally, it 
can be easily shown that the (tax financed) fiscal multiplier is given by the following 
expression (see Appendix A3 for details) where 
’
D Y  and 
’
S Y  are the slopes of the aggregate 












= .                                (25) 
While  
’
D Y  < 0 always holds, 
’
S Y  can be positive or negative within the framework developed 
above.  Therefore, the effect of a fiscal expansion depends on the size and sign of the ratio of 
the slopes of the two functions.  In particular, in the efficient situation when 
’
S Y  >0 the 
multiplier will – as in most recent new Keynesian studies of the effect of fiscal policy – lie 
between zero and unity.  But when the economy is operating inefficiently and 
’
S Y  <0, the 
multiplier can in fact exceed unity – as in the typical Keynesian case – or even become 
negative – like in models when more than full crowding out occurs.  However, the former 
case, in which the rise in output will be accompanied by a fall in employment, corresponds to 
an unstable initial equilibrium where –
’
S Y  > –
’
D Y  >0 whereas in the latter case  –
’
D Y  >–
’
S Y  >0 
and the initial equilibrium is stable. 
 
4.   Summary and Conclusions 
The main motivating factor underlying our study has been to explore the 
circumstances in which positive policy shocks might give rise to adverse employment effects.  
                                                 
8   It is a straightforward exercise to show that the aggregate supply function in (P,Y) space is nonlinear and can 
have more than one intersection with the aggregate demand. In such a situation, the equilibrium occurring  20 
Accordingly our objective has been two fold.  First, we have sought to describe the stylised 
facts regarding the co-movement of output and unemployment changes using data from ten 
West European countries.  Our simple data analysis shows that while in all countries 
unemployment changes and output changes can be either positively or negatively related, in 
seven of these countries we find a clear (and statistically significant) tendency for 
unemployment to be lower when output and unemployment are positively related and higher 
otherwise.  This suggests a humped-shape relationship between output and unemployment. 
Our second objective has been to outline a theoretical setting, which could give rise to such a 
relationship.  We have therefore constructed a stylised macro-model with goods and labour 
market imperfections and have shown that the equilibrium relationship between output and 
unemployment can in fact be positive when a rise in unemployment induces workers to 
supply a higher effort such that the positive effect of the gain in productivity outweighs the 
negative effect of the reduction in employment; otherwise we obtain the conventional result 
that output and unemployment are negatively related.  
 
Clearly, our results, which complement those of the literature on the effects of 
contractionary fiscal policy (see, for details, Barry and Devereux, 1995), suggest that 
plausible circumstances do exist in which market imperfections pose serious obstacles to the 
smooth working of expansionary and/or stabilization policies whose final aim is to improve 
welfare.  We show that the economy can rationally operate at an inefficient equilibrium, and 
that positive demand shocks in such circumstances will have perverse effects.  Accordingly, 
we conclude by stressing Lindbeck’s (1992) concerns about the effectiveness of 
macroeconomic stabilisation policy in the presence of labour and product market 
imperfection, which are echoed by our empirical and theoretical results.   
                                                                                                                                                        
where the aggregate demand curve is flatter than the (downward sloping) aggregate supply curve will be 
unstable. See Appendix A3 for further details on the slopes of aggregate demand and supply curves.  21 
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6. Appendix   
A1.   Derivation of the Effort Supply Function e(w, u, b) 
This appendix explains how a specific effort supply function such as that in equation 
(15) can be derived within the framework of the efficiency wage hypothesis where, following 
common practice, the agent is assumed to maximise the expected utility of remaining in 
employment.  
 
We assume that all households participate in the labour market and at any point in 
time a household can be in one of the following states: (i) employed (working); (ii) being 
fired (when caught shirking at work); (iii) unemployed (being without a job); or (iv) being 
hired (finding a job).  Let the utility indices corresponding to of the above states be denoted 
as follows: 
(i) employed  (working):  V
E 
(ii)  being fired (losing one’s job): V
F  
(iii)  unemployed (being without a job): V
U 





E can be obtained as follows.  Disregarding the money holdings and taxes 
(which are the same for all states) and focusing on unemployment benefit or wage as the only 
source of work-related income, the utility function in equation (6) implies that the indirect 
utility of an unemployed and an employed household is, respectively, 
P / B V
U = ,                                      (A1.1) 
and 
() ) e ( f P / W V
E − = .                                            (A1.2) 
While (A1.1) is straightforward, (A1.2) needs some explanation regarding f(e). We shall 
assume  0 f > ′  and  0 f ≥ ′ ′  which implies that the disutility of effort rises with a non- 25 
decreasing rate.  In particular, we shall use the explicit form 
2 ke ) e ( f =  where k>0 is a 
scaling factor.  
 
Finally, we need to specify V
H, which is the satisfaction a household attaches to 
finding a job or being hired.  But the utility associated with this state is in principle not 
distinguishable from V
E and for simplicity we let  
V
H = V
E,                         (A1.3) 
 
The probabilities associated with moving from one state to another are assumed to be 
determined as follows:  
 
(a) Probability associated with being fired when shirking, F.  
We assume that shirking is the only reason for being fired (we do not explicitly model the 
monitoring technology).  Therefore, ceteris paribus, F is a monotonic function of the effort 
level, e. Thus,  
() () () 0
de
dF
; 0 1 F ; 1 0 F ; e F F < = = = .  
For simplicity, normalise the maximum possible effort to unity and let  
F = 1 ￿ e.                         (A1.4) 
 
(b) Probability associated with finding a job, or being hired, when unemployed, H.  
We assume that the labour force is homogeneous and, ceteris paribus, H is a monotonic 
function of the unemployment rate, u (we do not explicitly model the search technology). 
Thus,  
() () () 0
du
dH
; 0 1 H ; 1 0 H ; u H H < = ≤ = . 
For simplicity we let  
H = 1 ￿ u.                           (A1.5)  26 
We define the optimal level of effort as that which maximises a household’s expected 




F.                      (A1.6) 
Also, given that a ‘fired’ worker can either be hired or remain unemployed, we let V
F be a 
weighted average of V
H  and  V




U.                        (A1.7) 
 
Equations (A1)-(A7) yield 
() () () ub ke w ) u 1 ( ) e 1 ( ke w e ) e ( R
2 2 + − − − + − = ,                   
where w=W/P and b=B/P.  This equation can be rearranged as   
() ub w ) u 1 ( e ) b w ( u ke ) u 1 ( uke ) e ( R
2 3 + − + − + − − − = .               (A1.8) 
 
The agent takes (w, b, u) as given and chooses e to maximise R(e). The first order 
condition for this is  () ( ) 0 ) b w ( k 3 / 1 e u 3 / ) u 1 ( 2 uke 3
2 = − + − − − .  This has two roots of 
which only one is positive which also satisfies the second order for a maximum and can, after 













+ − = γ ,                     (A1.9) 
where  γ  ≡3/k.  It is clear that equation (A1.9) satisfies our specified conditions, since 
b w as 0 ) u , b , w ( e ≥ ≥ ;  b w as ) 1 , 0 ( u 0 ) u , b , w ( e = ∈ ∀ = ;  0
w
e







eb < = ′
∂
∂
;   0
u
e
eu > = ′
∂
∂





ww < = ′ ′
∂
∂





bw > = ′ ′
∂ ∂
∂
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A2.   Derivation of Equations (20) and (21).  
We use the following equations (15), (17´), (18´) and (19) which are reproduced 
below as (A2.1)-(A2.4), respectively, 
) u , b , w ( e e = ,                                    (A2.1) 
e w ) u , b , w ( ew = ⋅ ′ ,                        (A2.2) 
w ) u , b , w ( e σ = ,                                    (A2.3) 
σ = ′ ) u , b , w ( ew .                              (A2.4) 
 
First, totally differentiating (A2.3) yields  






w σ = + + ,                         (A2.5) 
and substituting from (A2.4), i.e.  σ = ′ w e , in (A2.5) we obtain   




b = + ,                            (A2.6) 
which is solved to yield equation (20).  
 
Next, totally differentiating (A2.4) implies  






ww = + + ,                         (A2.7) 
and using (A2.6) to eliminate db we have  

















− + ,                       (A2.8) 

































= ,                       (A2.9) 
Substituting from (A2.9) into de = σ dw  implied by (A2.3), we obtain equation (21).  
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A3.   Derivation of the Fiscal Multiplier, Equation (25).  
We derive the fiscal multiplier as follows.  First, the aggregate demand function (AD) 
is derived by noting that  Y = C + G, where C is obtained by solving equations (8) and (9), 














                        (A3.1) 
Totally differentiating (A3.1), for any give M , then implies that on AD,  
dP
P ) 1 (
M










.                       (A3.2) 
Next, recalling from equations (23) and (7) that Y = wL  and L= 1-u,  we obtain, on the 
aggregate supply (AS) side, Y = w(1-u), which can be totally differentiated to yield 
dY = (1-u)dw ￿ wdu,                          (A3.3) 








































= .                     (A3.4) 
Also, using (A2.6) and the fact that for any given B,  dP
P
B





















= ,                           (A3.5) 
which can be substituted in (A3.4) to give the reaction of output to a change in the price level 




























































= .                   (A3.6) 
Simplifying notation and writing (A3.2) and (A3.6) as 
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dP Y dS










D Y  and 
’
S Y  are the slopes of AD  and AS in (P, Y) space.  Solving the above to 












= .                            (A3.5) 